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This article contributes to the banking eﬃciency literature by measuring technical
eﬃciency of banks in four diﬀerent ownership groups in India during the reform
period, 1992–1999. It employs the stochastic frontier function methodology for panel
data. The results indicate that the eﬃciency of raising interest margin is time invari-
ant while the eﬃciencies of raising other outputs-non-interest income, investments
and credits are time varying. The state bank group and foreign banks are more
eﬃcient than their counterparts. The reform period witnessed a relatively high eﬃ-
ciency for augmenting investments, which is consistent with economic growth objec-
tive of the reform measures. However, there are still larger gaps between the actual
and potential performances of banks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Studies estimating the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial institutions
(FIs) such as banks have relied on accounting measures
such as costs, outputs and proﬁt due to unavailability of
engineering information on the technology of FIs (Berger
and Humphrey, 1997).
1 Although these studies are numer-
ous and recent, most of them concern with developed
nations such as USA, Sweden and Finland (Berg et al.,
1993).
2 However, a few studies analyse the eﬃciency of
banks in developing countries. This article is an attempt
to contribute to this sparsely researched issue from the
perspective of developing economies, particularly India.
Indian banking is particularly interesting because of dif-
ferent and changing regulatory environment and the diver-
sity of bank ownership: State bank of India (SBI) group,
nationalized banks (NBs), privately owned domestic as well
as foreign banks.
3 The public sector banks (SBI and NBs)
acquired a place of prominence in the ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion process over the years. They made signiﬁcant strides in
expanding geographical coverage, mobilizing savings and
providing funds for investments in agriculture/small-scale
*Corresponding author. E-mail: shanmugam@mse.ac.in.
1They use at least ﬁve diﬀerent approaches to evaluate the performance of FIs: data envelopment approach (DEA), free disposal hull
(FDH), stochastic frontier approach (SFA), distribution free approach (DFA) and thick frontier approach (TFA).These methodologies
diﬀer due to the assumptions imposed on the data in terms of (i) the functional form of the frontier function (Berger and Mester, 1997),
(ii) more restrictive parametric form versus less restrictive non-parametric form (Giokas, 1991), (iii) whether or not account is taken of
random error, and iv) if there is random error, the probability distributions assumed for the one-sided ineﬃciency term (half normal,
truncated normal, exponential and gamma) used to disentangle the ineﬃciency term from the random error. Excellent reviews on these
approaches are available in Berger and Humphrey (1997), Greene (1993), Bauer (1990) and Kalirajan and Shand (1994).
2Berger and Humphrey (1997) found after reviewing 130 studies on the eﬃciency of FIs from 21 countries that 116 studies were
published during 1992–1997 and most of them analysed the eﬃciency of US banks.
3The banking system forms two-thirds of the ﬁnancial system in the country. According to CSO ﬁgures, this sector (along with insurance
sector) contributed about 1% of GDP in 1950–1951. Its share increased to 2.8% in 1980–1981. Further, it reached a peak of 7.8% in
1996–1997 from 5.3% in 1990–1991.
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regulated environment with interest rates, credit allocation
and entry being controlled by the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI). However, during the late 1980s, most banks were
plagued with poor proﬁtability and under capitalization
with a high proportion of non-performing assets and
huge administrative expenditures. They lagged behind the
international standards in introducing computers, commu-
nication technologies and product innovations and the
quality of consumer service was unsatisfactory.
Government of India set up the Narasimham committee
to review the functioning of entire ﬁnancial services indus-
try in the country. Based on the recommendations of
the committee (submitted in November 1991), the RBI
initiated major reform/liberalization measures that sought
to improve bank eﬃciency through entry deregulation,
branch delicensing and deregulation of interest rates and
to allow the public sector banks to raise up their equity
in the capital market. The reform also sought to improve
banking proﬁtability through gradual reduction of the cash
reserve ratio, the statutory liquidity ratio and relaxation of
several quantitative restrictions on the composition of
selected portfolios.
4
Since 1992–1993, the structure of the Indian banking
system has undergone signiﬁcant changes in terms of
scope, opportunities and operational buoyancy. The com-
mercial banks have been facing an increasing degree of
competition in the intermediation process from term lend-
ing institutions, non-banking intermediaries (like mutual
funds and leasing companies), chit funds and the capital
market. Besides, new banking services (ATM machines and
Internet banking) have been emerging due to the advance-
ment of computers and information technology. The
performance of public banks has become more market
driven with growing emphasis placed on proﬁtability. In
this context, it is essential to study whether the reform
measures are really beneﬁcial to the banking industry,
thereby eﬃciency improvement. Although a few studies
(Bhattacharyya et al., 1997; Das, 1997) measured the eﬃ-
ciency of Indian banks, they applied DEA approach and
provided the eﬃciency values up to 1991.
5 No estimates are
available after the reform initiation period.
This study is an attempt to measure the technical (in)ef-
ﬁciency of the Indian banking industry from 1992 to 1999.
It employs the stochastic frontier methodology for panel
data, which allows us to test whether TE varies over time
or not.
6 Although this study relates to India, it has a
broader appeal. The Indian experience during the liberal-
ization period provides us a unique opportunity to verify
whether the reform process really beneﬁts the banking
industry from the perspective of developing countries.
The results of the study could help other developing
nations, initiating reform process to take appropriate strat-
egy to improve the banking eﬃciency. The rest of the paper
proceeds as follows. Section II explains the methodology.
Data and model are explained in Section III. Section IV
presents the empirical results. The main conclusions are
given in Section V.
II. METHODOLOGY
This article utilizes the stochastic frontier production func-
tion model for panel data to measure technical eﬃciency
(TE). The frontier production function, f(.) is deﬁned as
the maximum feasible output that can be produced by a
bank with a given level of inputs and technology. The
actual production function of a bank can be written as:
Qit ¼ fðxit; Þexpð uitÞ;0   uit < 1;
i ¼ 1,2,...,n; t ¼ 1,2,...,T; ð1Þ
where Qit represents the actual output for the sample bank
i in period t; xit is a vector of inputs and   is a vector of
parameters that describe the transformation process; and
uit is a one-sided (non-negative) residual term. If the oper-
ation of a bank is ineﬃcient (eﬃcient), its actual output is
less than (equal to) the potential output. Therefore, one can
treat the ratio of the actual output Qit and potential output
f(.) as a measure of TE of a bank in period t.
The residual term uit is zero when the bank produces the
potential output (full TE) and is greater than zero when
production is below the frontier (less than full TE). In
general, the residual term uit (¼ TE eﬀect) and a bank’s
TE are inversely related. In order to capture the eﬀects of
omitted variables/measurement errors, a random noise vit
(i.i.d normal with mean 0 and variance  
2
v) can also be
included in Equation 1 as:
Qit ¼ fð:Þexpðvit   uitÞð 2Þ
Following Battese and Coelli (1992), one can write:
uit ¼ ui it ¼ ui expf  ðt   TiÞg; i ¼ 1,...,n,t 2 gðiÞ
ð3Þ
4The committee also recommended strengthening of banking system through the BIS norm of 8% capital adequacy ratio, income
recognition, assets classiﬁcations, etc.
5In the DEA approach, all banks share a common frontier and any variations in bank eﬃciency are measured relative to this frontier.
Hence, this approach ignores any random factors that inﬂuence the eﬃciency of a bank. Moreover, the results of this approach are very
sensitive to the selection of variables and data errors.
6Aigner et al. (1977), and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) independently developed the stochastic frontier approach to measure TE using
cross-section data. In recent years, the stochastic frontier approach has been extended to estimate time speciﬁc TE using panel data (see
Bauer, 1990; Greene, 1993; Kumbhakar et al., 1997 for reviews).
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be independently and identically distributed as truncated
normal with mean   and variance  
2
u,   is an unknown
parameter to be estimated and g(i) is the set of Ti time
periods for which observations for bank i are available.
Hence, the TE eﬀect of bank i in period t (i.e. uit) depends
on   and number of remaining periods (t Ti). When t¼Ti,
uit equals ui which can be treated as the TE eﬀect of bank i
in the last period Ti. From Equation 3, one can show that
as t increases, uit decreases, remains constant, or increases,
depending on whether   is greater than, equal to, or less
than zero. Therefore, a bank’s TE increases, remains the
same, or decreases over time, according to whether   is
positive, zero, or negative. Following the model speciﬁed
by Equations 2 and 3, the conditional expectation of
exp( uit), given the composite error term "it (¼ vit uit),
that is E[exp(  itui)|"it] would provide the measure of TE
of bank i in period t.
The model can be estimated by the maximum likelihood
(ML) method. Various parametric restrictions in the model
lead to a number of interesting cases. Setting  ¼0 reduces
the model to the traditional half-normal distribution
model.
7 If  ¼0, then TE is time-invariant (i.e. banks





2 ¼  
2
u þ  
2
v) will lie between 0 and 1. If ui¼0 (full TE),
then   equals zero and deviations from the frontier are
entirely due to noise vit. In this case, the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimates of the remaining parameters are
also ML estimates. When   ¼1, all deviations from the
frontier are due to technical ineﬃciency. One can test the
null hypothesis that   ¼ ¼ ¼0 using the generalized
likelihood-ratio test statistic, which equals twice the dif-
ference between the logarithmic likelihood values of the
unrestricted and restricted (  ¼ ¼ ¼0) ML estimates.
The test statistic is a mixed  
2 (with degrees of freedom
equal to 3).
8
III. DATA AND MODEL
There is a debate in the literature over what banks produce
(output) and what resources banks consume in that pro-
cess (inputs). Most banking studies have adopted either
the production approach or the intermediation approach.
9
The former approach considers that banks use capital,
labour and other non-ﬁnancial inputs to provide (deposits
and advances) services for account holders (Ferrier and
Lovell, 1990). In the latter, banks are intermediating
funds between savers and investors and incur interest
expense and other operating expenses to provide revenue-
generating services. Therefore, investments, advances and
deposits are treated as outputs.
10
The Indian commercial banks have multiple goals.
11
Although they are proﬁt-oriented, the regulatory agency
(RBI) has the objectives of fostering economic growth
and preserving the safety and soundness of the banking
system. Considering these objectives, the study considers
four outputs (Qi)-net interest margin (interest earned
minus interest paid, reﬂecting the gain in ﬁnancial interme-
diation process), non-interest income (commission, broker-
age, etc. reﬂecting revenues from other services), credits
and investments (in government/approved securities). The
ﬁrst two would reﬂect the proﬁt goal, while the rest the
economic growth and safety objectives. The inputs used
are deposits (D), borrowings (B), labour (L) and ﬁxed
assets (A).
12 The data on inputs and output of commercial
banks in India from 1992 to 1999 have been compiled from
the Statistical tables relating to banks in India published by
the RBI. All monetary values are converted into 1980–1981
prices using appropriate deﬂator. Due to missing data, 94
banks belonging to 4 ownership groups are included in the
empirical analysis. The ﬁnal data set is an unbalanced
panel of observations (a total of 618) on outputs and
inputs. The following Cobb–Douglas functional form was
employed (as it provides the best ﬁt):
lnQit ¼  0t þ  1t lnDit þ  2t ln it þ  3t lnLit þ  4t lnAit
þ vit    itui ð4Þ
Table 1 provides the means and standard deviations of
variables used in the study.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 2 shows the ML estimation results of Equation 4.
Column 2 of the table presents the results of interest mar-
gin (ln Q1) equation with   and   unrestricted. Since the
asymptotic t values on the estimated value of   is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at 5% level (indicating that the bank
eﬀects are time invariant), we have imposed a restriction
7This model will not check for other distributions such as gamma and exponential distributions.
8In this model, TE is monotone over time and one rate of change (over time) applies to all sample ﬁrms.
9Berger et al. (1992) provide a detailed discussion of these alternative approaches. Since these approaches utilize diﬀerent but over-
lapping sets of inputs/outputs, the extent to which they generate diﬀerent empirical results concerning the bank performance remains an
open question (Bauer et al., 1998).
10Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) consider investments, advances and deposits as outputs of Banks in India.
11Coates (1990) provides a comprehensive discussion of the objectives of the Indian banking system, for which the production approach
would be inappropriate.
12The labor input is measured as the number of employees since the skill speciﬁc employment details are not available.
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13 Column 3 pro-
vides the revised estimation results. All inputs have positive
eﬀects. However, only the eﬀects of deposit and borrowing
variables are statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level. But the
labor coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant only at 10% level. The
deposit is the dominant factor in determining the interest
margin, as its parameter is the largest (0.66). The signiﬁcant
  term indicates that u follows a truncated normal distri-
bution.  
2 and   terms are positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant at 5% level, indicating that the observed level of
interest margin signiﬁcantly diﬀer from frontier level due to
factors, which are within the control of banks. The esti-
mated value of   indicates that 64% of the diﬀerence
between actual and potential output is due to technically
ineﬃcient performance of banks.
The ML estimates of non-interest income (ln Q2), invest-
ments (ln Q3) and credits (ln Q4) are shown in columns 4–6
of Table 2. In all cases, parameters of all inputs are posi-
tive. Notably, all are statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level,
except the assets variable in the investments equation.
However, this variable is signiﬁcant at 10% level. The
deposit variable is again the dominant factor in determin-
ing all these output measures. The likelihood ratio test
rejects the null hypothesis of   ¼ ¼ ¼0 in all three equa-
tions. Interestingly,  
2 and   are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at 5% level in all cases, revealing ineﬃcient per-
formance of banks in producing these outputs. The esti-
mated values of   are 0.84, 0.26 and 0.54 in non-interest
income, investment and credit equations. The   and  
terms are statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level in all cases,
indicating that u follows a truncated normal distribution
and the bank speciﬁc eﬀects associated with TE are time
varying in all.
Technical eﬃciency estimates
Table 3 shows means, standard deviations and coeﬃcient
of variations (C.V) of time invariant TE values of raising
interest margin by bank groups. The mean TE value of
44.6% indicates that on an average the sample banks real-
ize only 45% of their technical abilities in raising interest
margin. That is, more than half of their technical potential
is not yet utilized. The SBI group ranks ﬁrst with mean
TE value of 59%. The privately owned foreign banks ranks
second (52.4%), the nationalized group third (46%)
and the privately owned domestic banks the last. The
ANOVA (F) test value also indicates that mean diﬀerences
of eﬃciencies in diﬀerent groups are signiﬁcant.
13There are two basic methods of estimation if TE is time invariant: ﬁxed eﬀect and random eﬀect. The choice of the estimation method
rests on the type of eﬀect. Hausman’s statistics supports the random eﬀect. The Lagrangian multiplier test also conﬁrms a considerable
heterogeneity across the sample units and rules out application of any simple least square technique. Hence, either GLS or MLE
techniques can provide consistent estimates of parameters. The latter was chosen.
Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of stochastic frontier functions for Indian banks
Variables
Interest margin (Q1) Commission,
brokerage etc. (Q2) Investments (Q3) Credits (Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant  0.7437 (4.480)  0.7651 (4.241)  1.9789 (13.372)  0.2591 (2.727) 1.2932 (14.219)
Ln D 0.6914 (14.529) 0.6611 (15.222) 0.4690 (12.536) 0.8484 (27.103) 0.6013 (19.187)
Ln B 0.0491 (3.349) 0.0441 (4.046) 0.1130 (9.802) 0.0516 (5.343) 0.1277 (14.061)
Ln A 0.0433 (1.665) 0.0244 (1.095) 0.1162 (5.129) 0.0307 (1.774) 0.0701 (4.115)
Ln L 0.0069 (0.181) 0.0472 (1.641) 0.1718 (5.665) 0.0539 (2.645) 0.0743 (3.187)
 
2 0.2896 (5.166) 0.2868 (5.869) 0.3731 (5.089) 0.0731 (7.156) 0.0909 (7.837)
  0.6383 (10.028) 0.6401 (12.625) 0.8438 (56.098) 0.2637 (3.692) 0.5417 (10.809)
  0.8599 (4.795) 0.8569 (5.014) 1.1227 (8.134) 0.2777 (4.948) 0.4439 (6.347)
   0.0137 (0.994) – 0.0115 (2.124) 0.0586 (3.745) 0.0241 (2.272)
Log-likelihood  286.766  287.767  184.253  38.947  1.455
 
2 257.579 255.577 564.716 106.939 202.990
Iterations 19 16 15 14 15
Notes: Figures in parentheses indicate the absolute asymptotic t-values.






Interest margin (Q1) Rs. in Crore 61.69 151.29
Non-interest income (Q2) Rs. in Crore 17.21 51.52
Investments (Q3) Rs. in Crore 693.30 1547.86
Credits (Q4) Rs. in Crore 871.56 2036.26
Deposits (D) Rs. in Crore 1667.21 3604.86
Borrowings (B) Rs. in Crore 101.97 333.81
Fixed assets (A) Rs. in Crore 27.65 46.67
Labour (L) Numbers 12302.83 28978.50
Notes: The total sample is 618. All monetary values are in
1980–1981 prices.
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overall mean TE value of banks in raising non-interest
income increased from 30% in 1992 to 32.8% in 1999.
Similarly, the mean TE values of raising investments
and credits went up from 65.7% and 58.7% in 1992 to
75.6% and 64.2% respectively in 1999. Lower mean
value of TE for raising non-interest income (emanating
from commission, exchange and brokerage which are
essentially outputs of customer services) suggests that
Indian banks are still not able to provide better customer
services. However, a relatively high value of TE for aug-
menting investments in the reform period was a rational
response towards operational ﬂexibility, functional auton-
omy and portfolio choice as against embarking on risky
bank credit portfolio. Lower TE for raising bank credit
(as compared to TE for raising investments) should also
be seen against strict capital adequacy measures imposed
in the reform period.
Table 5 provides the mean TE values for diﬀerent bank
groups in raising their other income, investments and cred-
its. The mean TE values of raising non-interest income over
the years were relatively high in SBI group (ranging
between 48.7–51.4%) as compared to those in other groups
due to the fact that the SBI undertake most of the gov-
ernment business transactions (including major borrowing
programs), thereby earning more non-interest income
than other groups. The mean TE values during the same
Table 5. Time-varying mean eﬃciency values by bank groups
Year Commission etc. Investment Credit Cases Year Commission etc. Investment Credit Cases
1. State bank group 2. Nationalized banks
1992 48.70 66.73 70.30 8 1992 23.41 70.59 64.13 19
1993 49.09 68.27 70.88 8 1993 23.79 71.97 64.79 19
1994 49.49 69.75 71.44 8 1994 24.18 73.29 65.44 19
1995 49.88 71.18 72.00 8 1995 24.57 74.57 66.09 19
1996 50.26 72.56 72.55 8 1996 24.96 75.80 66.72 19
1997 50.65 73.88 73.09 8 1997 25.35 76.98 67.35 19
1998 51.04 75.15 73.63 8 1998 25.74 78.12 67.97 19
1999 51.42 76.38 74.15 8 1999 26.13 79.20 68.58 19
3. Private domestic banks 4. Private foreign banks
1992 19.77 56.86 48.8 21 1992 40.23 70.16 59.34 19
1993 19.98 58.33 49.51 22 1993 38.75 71.65 59.97 19
1994 20.34 60.11 50.33 22 1994 38.98 73.36 61.64 21
1995 20.56 61.83 50.86 21 1995 40.28 75.01 62.61 20
1996 23.36 64.86 55.18 31 1996 40.31 75.70 62.39 23
1997 23.13 66.24 56.09 31 1997 41.37 75.92 64.84 25
1998 23.77 68.37 56.36 33 1998 41.07 77.19 66.14 32
1999 24.20 69.75 57.68 32 1999 41.2 79.47 65.80 30
Table 4. Summary of time varying eﬃciency values of banking industry
Commission etc., Investments Credits
Year Mean SD CV Mean SD CV Mean SD CV Cases
1992 30.06 16.12 53.61 65.70 10.18 15.5 58.70 13.52 23.03 67
1993 29.72 15.98 53.77 67.03 9.97 14.87 59.22 13.35 22.55 68
1994 30.30 15.95 52.63 68.77 9.71 14.12 60.24 13.51 22.42 70
1995 30.93 16.11 52.07 70.37 9.44 13.42 61.06 13.51 22.13 68
1996 31.20 15.84 50.76 71.27 8.82 12.38 61.65 12.73 20.65 81
1997 31.78 15.89 50.00 72.35 8.27 11.43 62.94 12.38 19.67 83
1998 32.56 16.45 50.51 74.04 8.57 11.58 63.66 12.67 19.91 92
1999 32.79 16.56 50.50 75.64 8.26 10.92 64.22 12.37 19.26 89
Table 3. Time invariant eﬃciency values of raising interest margin
Category Mean SD CV Cases
SBI Group 58.94 14.55 24.68 8
Nationalized 46.31 14.06 30.37 19
Private-domestic 32.10 8.43 26.28 33
Private-Foreign 52.39 16.89 32.25 34
All Banks 44.59 16.61 37.25 94
Notes: ANOVA Results: mean square for between groups¼
2972.26 and within groups¼186.01. The F-value is 15.98.
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23–26% for nationalized and 19.8–24.2% for private
domestic group. The nationalized group and private
domestic groups seem to be most eﬃcient in raising invest-
ments as compared to the SBI group and the private
domestic group. In terms of the mean TE value of rais-
ing credits, the SBI group ranks ﬁrst, the nationalized
group the second, the private-foreign group third and
private-domestic groups obtains the last rank.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This article has analysed the eﬃciency of banks in India
during 1992–1999. The data set is an unbalanced panel of
94 banks (a total of 618), belonging to four diﬀerent
ownership groups. Considering the objectives of indi-
vidual banks and the regulatory agency (RBI), it has
considered four outputs–interest margin, non-interest
income, investment and credit. In order to measure
bank eﬃciencies, it has utilized the stochastic frontier
approach for panel data. The results indicate the dom-
inance of deposit in producing all outputs. There are
considerable evidences that the observed outputs are
less than their respective potential outputs due to techni-
cal ineﬃciency of banks. The technical eﬃciency of rais-
ing interest margin is varied widely across sample banks
and is time-invariant. Even though several reform mea-
sures have been introduced since 1992, they have not so
far helped the banks in raising their interest margin.
However, the banking industry shows a progress in
terms of eﬃciency of raising non-interest income, invest-
ments and credits. The eﬃciency improvement is consid-
erable in the case of investments in all banks, particularly
in private banks. Thus, the result matches with the
economic growth objective of the reform measure.
Besides, there appears to be wide variations in the
achievement of eﬃciency among sample banks and among
bank groups in raising non-interest income, investment and
credit. Notably, about 50% of the sample banks have TE
values, which are below average value in all cases, except
the investments. Most of them are nationalized and pri-
vate domestic banks. The results in general indicate that
the state bank group and private-foreign group banks
perform better than their counter parts. This study would
be useful to international development agencies, econo-
mists and policy-makers in evaluating and improving the
economic performance of banking sector in India.
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